原标题: 遵义市妇幼保健院口腔整形科普及指南
Economic policymaking in the west has developed in radical ways since the global financial crisis. When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, the US after some hesitation allowed the Federal Reserve to intervene in the markets. Afterwards, the European Central Bank did the same in response to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other EU states. 全球金融危机爆发以后,西方在制定经济政策方面趋向激进。2008年雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产后,美国只犹豫了一阵,就允许美联储(Fed)干预市场。之后欧洲央行(ECB)也如法炮制,以类似手段应对希腊及其他欧盟(EU)国家的主权债务危机。 Since then, quantitative easing has had a real impact on western markets. So-called helicopter drops are now in vogue, and negative interest rates have gained acceptance in spite of widesp anxiety about their unknown effects. The fashion for unconventional monetary policy was highlighted yesterday with the ECB’s decision to cut interest rates in the eurozone to a record low and to expand its quantitative easing package. 从那以来,量化宽松对西方市场产生了切实的影响。所谓的“直升机撒钱”大行其道。负利率的未知影响尽管引起广泛焦虑,也还是为人们所接受。上周四欧洲央行将欧元区利率降到历史新低,并扩大一揽子量化宽松措施,凸显了非常规货币政策的盛行。 But there are other ways of stimulating demand. Why, for instance, do western governments refuse to set up state-owned enterprises that will create jobs? Are they really so much worse than QE and low or negative interest rates? 但是,要刺激需求还有其他方式。比如说,西方国家政府为何不愿设立能够创造就业的国有企业?国有企业真的比量化宽松或者低利率乃至负利率糟糕得多吗? A number of concerns surround the state sector. First, it is less efficient than private businesses. But when private investment falls well below a desired level, the state should step in to fill the gap. In any case, it is debatable whether state-run enterprises are less efficient than welfare spending, direct subsidies, QE or negative interest rates. 人们对国有企业抱着各种担忧。首先,国有企业的效率比不上私营企业。但当私人投资远低于所希望的水平时,国家应该介入以填补缺口。无论如何,国有企业是否真的比福利出、直接补贴、量化宽松或者负利率这些政策更低效还值得商榷。 Second, will investment by the state sector necessarily displace (or “crowd out”, as economists like to say) the private sector? Evidence is mixed. In some cases, this may happen if the state competes with private companies for financing, pushing up borrowing costs. But the west today does not have to worry about that, since it is sliding into a zero-interest rate environment. 第二,国有部门的投资是否一定会替代(或者经济学家们喜欢用“挤出”这个词)私有部门的投资?正反面的据都有。在某些情况下,如果国有企业和私营企业竞争融资,推高了借贷成本,这种情况的确可能发生。但眼下西方无需担忧这个问题,因为西方正滑向零利率环境。 Moreover, evidence from around the world suggests that the state sector supports the operation of the private sector. It can even help to incubate new private industries by providing “patient capital” and basic infrastructure, as well as physical facilities. 此外,来自世界各地的据表明,国有部门为私营部门的运行提供持。况且,通过提供“有耐心的资本”(patient capital)、基本的基础设施以及实物设备,国有部门甚至会帮助孵化新的私营产业。 There is not much that China can teach the rest of the world about economic policy. Nevertheless, its experience in the past century or so can be a useful reference point for policymakers. 在经济政策方面,中国可教给世界其他地区的不多。然而,中国一个多世纪以来积累的经验可以为政策制定者提供有用的参考。 In 1911, at the end of the empire, China adopted capitalism but the experiment failed. The Nationalist government was pushed out to Taiwan 38 years later and China embarked on a disastrous communist path. 1911年,在帝制瓦解后,中国采取了资本主义,但这场实验失败了。38年后,国民党政府被赶到了台湾,中国大陆走上了多灾多难的共产主义道路。 Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the ideological pendulum swung back towards capitalism and the country settled on a mixed economy. 1976年毛泽东去世以后,意识形态钟摆再度摆向了资本主义,中国选择了混合制经济。 Today about two-thirds of China’s economy is still state-controlled. And, while it is debatable whether a smaller state sector would be more desirable, the chances are that the dominance of state-run enterprises will continue for the foreseeable future. 今天,国有经济在中国经济中依然占三分之二左右。尽管人们还在争论,是否收缩国有部门更可取,但在可预见的未来,国有企业仍将继续占主导地位。 If a referendum were to take place in China today on the relative merits of both sectors, I suspect a vast majority would favour the state, despite widesp public dissatisfaction with state-owned companies. 如果今天在中国就国有部门和私有部门的各自优点举行一场全民公投,我估计,尽管公众对国有企业普遍感到不满,绝大多数人还是会持国有企业。 There is a social dimension here, too. Welfare spending and helicopter drops do not offer the satisfaction that flows to a workforce gainfully employed in the state sector. 这里面也存在一个社会层面的因素。像国有部门职工所获得的那种满意度,福利出和直升机撒钱这些方式是无法提供的。 Staunch defenders of the free market are suspicious of SOEs on the grounds that they entrench corruption. This is a legitimate concern but one that can be mitigated by controlling the size of the state sector in a climate of public scrutiny. 自由市场之拥趸对国有企业抱着怀疑态度,理由是国有企业会滋生腐败。这种担忧是合理的,但是,通过实行公共监督、控制国有部门的规模,是可以缓解这种担忧的。 It remains true, too, that state-owned enterprises can supplement a dominant private sector and, arguably, correct market failures at least as efficiently as the policy instruments that at present are favoured by western governments. 有一点依然毋庸置疑:在私有部门占主导的情况下,国有企业能够对私有部门起到补充作用;也可以认为,对于纠正市场失灵,国有企业至少和当前西方国家政府所好的那些政策工具一样有效。 /201603/431850The future of the city is an industry. Cities have always been big business, machines for creating money and culture, a means for people to gather and create a civilised, comfortable life. The making of the city is itself a fundamental process in the development of capitalism. The city’s property and infrastructure have always been vehicles for speculation and, on occasion, stupendous profit.城市的未来发展是一项产业。城市一直以来都是一门大生意,是创造财富与文化的机器,是将人们汇聚在一起、创造文明舒适生活的一种机制。城市的形成本身就是资本主义发展进程中的一个基础阶段。城市的房地产和基础设施一直是投机活动的载体,有些时候还会带来巨大的利润。The modern, successful city is a realisation of what the late French film-maker and provocateur Guy Debord forecast would be a “Society of Spectacle”. Within this, success is gauged by skyscrapers and super-luxury apartments that come with record prices attached. It is measured by blockbuster cultural institutions and shopping streets sparkling with the logos of global brands. It is assessed by spurious quality of life surveys that rate the availability of exotic coffees and artisan cheeses above the quality of social housing or healthcare.成功的现代城市已经把已故法国电影导演及先锋活动家居伊#8226;德波(Guy Debord)所预言的《景观社会》(Society of Spectacle)变为现实。在景观社会中,成功是由天大楼以及价格创纪录的超豪华公寓来判定的,是由大型文化机构以及闪耀着国际大牌标志的购物街来衡量的,是由站不住脚的生活质量调查来评判的,这些调查将能否享受到异国情调的咖啡和传统手工奶酪看得比社会保障性住房(social housing)和医疗保健务的质量更重要。Over the past decade or so, the city has been monetised as a futures market — not only in the old fashioned manner of property development and speculation but through reconceiving its inhabitants as consumers rather than citizens. We have all become data. The technology we use at home, in the office and, above all, carry in our pockets has radically transformed the way we can be tracked and the way we will be targeted.在过去的十来年中,城市经历货币化成为了一个期货市场——不仅仅是通过房地产开发及投机这种传统方式,还通过将城市居民重新看作是消费者而非公民。我们都变成了数据,我们在家中、在办公室使用以及放在口袋里随身携带的技术,已显著地改变了我们被追踪以及我们被当作务目标的方式。The city’s characteristic cocktail of anonymity and sociability — the potential to become lost in a crowd — is changing fast. Aly, smartphones have transformed the way we use the city. Our reliance on Google Maps and apps strips us of our observation and our need to understand the grain and texture of the city streets. Disruptive apps such as Uber are changing the way we move around.城市所特有的匿名性和社交性的融合——也即在人群中消失的可能性——正在迅速变化。智能手机已经改变了我们与城市的相处模式。我们对谷歌地图以及各种应用的依赖剥夺了我们自己对于城市的观察,也让我们变得不再需要去理解城市街道的纹理。优步(Uber)等颠覆性的应用正在改变我们的出行方式。How do we make a sustainable city, in which citizens are treated with respect rather than as data? How will they compete with each other beyond being mere vehicles for property investment or as instruments of the markets?我们应如何打造一座可持续发展的城市,使城市中的居民受到尊敬而非仅仅被看作数字?除了作为地产投资的载体或者作为市场的工具,城市之间又将如何竞争?There is a lot of hype surrounding the so-called Smart City — the idea of the city as a connected network in which mass information collection allows more efficient operation. Its potential has been overstated, but its arrival does signal a change in the idea of the city into a forum for hyper-surveillance and data farming. That change is compounded by a marked shift from the city as public realm to a new conception of its streets and squares as a massive mall without walls.当前围绕所谓的“智慧城市”(smart city)有大量炒作——这一概念将城市看成是一个紧密相连的网络,网络中的大规模数据收集使更有效率的运作成为可能。智慧城市的潜力被过分夸大,但其出现是一个信号,表明有关城市的概念正在逐渐转变为有关超级监管以及数据耕耘(data farming)的论坛。这一转变还伴随着城市观点的一个显著变化,对城市的认知从公共领域变成了将街道和广场看作没有围墙的巨型购物中心的新观念。The creation of business investment districts across the UK and US and the construction of privately owned developments blur the boundaries between the genuine public commons and private property. As the public sector continues to shrink in the neoliberal city, infrastructure is increasingly left to private capital and the economies of cities are driven by the mantra of “regeneration”.英美各地出现的商业投资区、以及私人所有开发项目的建设模糊了真正的公共空间与私人地产之间的界限。随着公共部门在新自由主义的城市中继续萎缩,基础设施建设正越来越多由私人资本承担,而推动城市经济的则是“重建”准则。This has become a cliché and it can be a very blunt device. The line between regeneration and gentrification is often virtually invisible. There is, of course, nothing new in these issues. When the notorious Old Nichol slums in London’s East End were cleared to make way for the London County Council’s Boundary Estate, opened in 1900, residents complained that they were being turfed out. The hard drinkers were discriminated against in favour of what politicians might now call “hard working families”.这已经成了陈词滥调,而且可以成为一种非常粗暴的手段。重建和“中产阶级化”的界限常常是几乎不可见的。当然,关于这些问题完全没有任何新鲜之处。当伦敦东区(East End)声名狼藉的老尼科尔(Old Nichol)贫民区被清理出来,为伦敦郡议会(London County Council)修建包恩德里住宅区(Boundary Estate)让路时——该住宅区于1900年建成——住在老尼科尔的居民抱怨自己被赶了出来。那些酒鬼受到了歧视,得到优待的则是或许会被如今的政治家称为“勤劳的工薪家庭”的群体。The urban renewal strategies of the 1960s and 1970s in US city centres were dismissed by African-Americans in poorer districts as designed to remove them. In London more recently, the efforts to demolish and rebuild many of the few remaining city centre social housing estates — notably the Aylesbury estate in Southwark, in the southeast of the capital — have led to protest and squatting, as residents accuse the authorities of social cleansing.二十世纪六七十年代美国城市中心的城区重建计划遭到了贫穷街区非裔美国人的反对,他们指责此类计划是为了将他们赶走。更晚些时候在伦敦,对于城市中心少数保存下来的社会住宅区,为将其中的一大部分拆除和重建所做的努力——特别是伦敦东南部南华克区(Southwark)的艾尔斯伯里(Aylesbury)住宅区——引发了抗议和擅自占用房屋的情况,当地居民指责当局借机进行社会清洗。The question for city centres is how they can embrace the complexity of uses and the social mix from which their character has derived — and whether there is any way to maintain these communities and relationships. Or alternatively, do we just accept that cities change and that we need to adapt?城市中心面临的问题是,如何才能承载好复杂多样的功能以及容纳作为城市自身特色来源的多元化社会群体——此外是否还有维持这些社区和关系的办法?或者说,我们是不是就应接受城市会发生变化,而我们需要适应这种变化的事实?For the moment, there is a sense that New York, London, Paris and other global cities are resting on their laurels. They revel in their continued popularity and the status of their property as what the City of London’s former planner, Peter Rees called “safe deposit boxes” for the super-rich, while failing to ensure they remain accessible to a social mix.就目前而言,纽约、伦敦、巴黎以及其他国际大都市给人一种躺在往日荣光中不思进取的感觉。这些城市陶醉于它们仍然受到的欢迎以及城中地产作为超富阶层“保险箱”的地位——用伦敦金融城前规划官彼得#8226;李斯(Peter Rees)的话来说——而未能确保这些地产仍然能够容纳多元化的社会群体。These are real problems, because what makes cities great is the dynamism that derives from their particular cocktails of class, ethnicity, eccentricity and opportunity. Without that blend they become either dull tourist centres — take central Paris, for example, or, increasingly, central London — with little authentic life, or two-tier cities with the poor populations marginalised on the edges and effectively disenfranchised from urban processes. Paris, again, strikes as an example.以上都是实实在在的问题,因为使城市变得伟大的正是阶层、种族、特异性和机遇的特定融合所产生的活力。没有了这种融合,城市要么变成枯燥无聊的旅游中心——例如巴黎中心城区,或者伦敦市中心也愈发如此——几乎没有真实的生活气息,要么变成两级分化的城市,贫困人口被边缘化至城郊生活,在事实上被剥夺了参与城市运转过程的权利。在这方面巴黎也可以作为例子。The most successful and creative cities tend to be those with a degree of redundancy, that is to say with a little slack in their space where property value does not dictate every move or development. These are not necessarily the same as those cities that are the wealthiest or the most equitable or even the most liveable.最成功而富有创造力的城市,通常是那些具有一定冗余的城市,也就是说,在城市的空间里存在些微余地,那里的迁移或者开发并不全由房产价值决定。这些城市并不一定是那些最富有的或者最平等的城市,甚至不一定是最宜居的。New York, for instance, was at a creative peak in the period after the second world war and, arguably, again in the 1970s, when it was virtually bankrupt, sliding into a massive crime wave and suffering from radical depopulation as the middle class moved out to the suburbs. Everything from abstract expressionism and jazz to literature and graphics thrived there in that period.以纽约为例,它的创造力巅峰期是在第二次世界大战结束以后以及二十世纪七十年代,虽然后一段时期存在争议。二十世纪七十年代的纽约几近破产,陷入了大规模犯罪潮,并因中产阶级搬至郊区而遭遇了人口的急剧减少。但当时从抽象表现主义和爵士音乐到文学和绘画艺术等各种艺术形式都在纽约蓬勃发展。London’s greatest modern creative spurt may well have been during roughly the same period, namely from the Swinging Sixties to the mid-1980s, when it was a city in transition, pockmarked with bomb sites and with social housing going up in once-affluent and central areas.伦敦重要的现代创造力喷涌期差不多也在同一时期,即从摇摆的六十年代(Swinging Sixties)到二十世纪八十年代中期。当时的伦敦是一座变化中的城市,既有坑坑洼洼的炸弹爆炸痕迹,也有在曾经的中心富人区拔地而起的社会住宅(social housing,类似有些国家或地区的廉租房——编者注)。Berlin’s best periods were the fraught 1920s, when the city was recovering from a devastating lost war, and the 1990s, when it found a huge property resource in the office space left over when the Communist political bureaucracy — and the endless web of buildings inhabited by the Stasi intelligence network — was dismantled and left redundant. This all left property affordable and available to students, artists and anyone else.柏林的黄金时代是激荡的二十世纪二十年代,当时这座城市正从一场极具破坏力的失败战争中恢复过来;此外还有二十世纪九十年代,柏林从共产主义政治官僚体系解体后留存下来并闲置的办公空间中——还包括斯塔西(Stasi,前东德国家安全部)情报网络所占用的难以计数的房屋——获得了大量地产资源。这使得住房对于学生、艺术家以及任何其他人来说都变得可以获得并且负担得起。The traditional measures of success — wealth and GDP — might serve to underline profitability and suitability of the city as a place for the global rich to park their money, but they do little to ensure that success will be sustained.衡量成功的传统标准——例如财富和GDP——或许能够凸显城市作为全球富豪投资载体的盈利性和适宜性,但这些指标对于确保城市的成功能够延续几乎没有帮助。When cities become too successful, they marginalise exactly the eccentricity and experimentation that lead to new ideas. An overdose of success can kill a city.当城市变得过于成功,它们就会将能够产生新创意的特异性和实验精神边缘化。过量的成功能够杀死一座城市。Perhaps the message is to be careful what you wish for.这对于我们的启示或许是,许愿时要小心。 /201608/462372

On Sunday artist Jianguo Xiongdi sent the dust he spent 100 days collecting from the Beijing air to a factory in Tangshan, Hebei Province. Now all he had to do was wait three days for the factory to send him back the dust - in brick form. This is part of what he is calling the Dust Project.周日,艺术者“坚果兄弟”将100天来收集的北京雾霾送往河北唐山的一家制砖厂,只等3天后工厂给他寄回一块板砖。这是他“尘埃计划”的一部分。;The first part of the project was collecting the dust from the air for 100 days. The second part was sending it to the brick factory. For the third part I plan to mix the brick in with ordinary bricks at a construction site. The final step will be watching it disappear into a sea of bricks,; Jianguo Xiongdi told the Global Times. Smiling, he said that he was considering choosing a skyscraper construction site in Beijing#39;s Central Business District.“尘埃计划的第一步是收集100天空气中的灰尘,第二步是把收集到的灰尘送到制砖厂,第三步我打算将这块砖用作建筑工地的材料,和其他砖块一样,最后一步就是看着它融入茫茫砖海。”坚果兄弟笑着向环球时报说到,他还在考虑把这块砖用于北京中央商务区某天大厦中。He first began preparing for this project in 2013, when the strong smog in Beijing started raising public concern. However, the project was postponed for two years, leading to the artist picking it up again this year in order to call more attention to air pollution.他的这个“尘埃计划“始于2013年,当时北京的雾霾天气引起了公众的高度关注。但这一计划推迟了两年,空气污染问题让他在今年重拾该计划,希望以此引起人们对空气污染的更多关注。;Our city has become a jar of cars, a place surrounded by chemical factories and a giant construction sites. The more we chase things, the more resources we need and the more dust we produce. When all the resources on Earth are exhausted someday, we will become the real dust,; Jianguo Xiongdi writes in the introduction to the Dust Project.“我们的城市现在成了一个汽车堵城,一个化工围城,一个建筑工城。我们追求的越多,对资源索取的越多,制造的尘埃也就越多。当地球上的资源消耗殆尽之时,我们就成了真正的微尘”,坚果兄弟在”尘埃计划“的介绍中这样写道。He started collecting the dust on July 24 using an industrial vacuum cleaner with a 0.2 micrometer filter and walking the streets for four hours a day. He said he went out almost every day except for when it rained or snowed. He recorded the entire process on his Sina Weibo account.从7月24日开始,他就开始用过滤精度为0.2微米的工业真空吸尘器吸尘,每天走在街头4小时,每天坚持出去吸尘,除非是下雨下雪天,他把整个吸尘过程发布在微上。;Actually, I only collected about 100 grams of dust. This wasn#39;t enough to make a brick, so I asked the factory to add some clay,; he told the Global Times.“事实上,我收集到的100克尘埃是不够制作板砖的,所以我就让工厂加了些制砖的黏土”,他向环球时报说道。Occasionally working as an advertiser and having held several exhibitions in Shenzhen and Beijing, Jianguo Xiongdi said that while some call him an artist, he thinks of himself as just an unemployed guy who cares about society.坚果兄弟已在深圳和北京举办多次展览,有时也是广告宣传者,坚果兄弟说虽然一些人称他为艺术家,但他觉得自己只是个关心社会的无业者。His first performance art project, A Bookstore Closed Up in 30 Days, was widely reported on by local media in 2011. Later he established a company called Meaningless, which hired people to do meaningless things such as taking selfies while on the toilet or to ride public transportation and prove to other passengers that they were not psychotic.他的第一个艺术项目,2011年的“30天就倒闭书店”项目在当地报导很多,之后他成立了一个叫“无意义”的公司,公司雇佣人们做些毫无意义的事,比如在马桶上自拍、在公交或地铁上向乘客明他们不是神经病等等。The Shenzhen-based artist has come to Beijing quite frequently in recent years. During his 100-days in Beijing this time, he began 11 art projects, including an exhibition called Beijing Heihua which was held at the Arc Space from September 16 to October 25. The exhibition consisted of a room whose walls were covered in white paper. On the paper the artist has written the cell-phone numbers of 1,000 intermediately agents that he had collected online.这位深圳艺术者近些年来往北京较为频繁,这次在北京的100天时间里,他开启了11个艺术项目,其中包括一个名“黑化”的展览,9月16日-25日在北京Arc Space(北京唯一一家深入到大学校园社区中的替代性空间,隐藏在老居民楼里的艺术实验场)举办,展示了一个房间,房间四周墙上贴着白纸,纸上写着他在网上联系过的1000个中介的手机号码。;Many people have been cheated by intermediary agents. So I decided to collect their cell-phone numbers to create an exhibition,; he told the Global Times.“因为很多人都被中介坑过,所以我决定收集他们的手机号办一场展览”,他这样向环球时报说道。 /201512/413605

Four of the Hong Kong booksellers who vanished last year before reappearing in mainland police custody have admitted to smuggling critical political works into China, according to taped confessions and a Chinese news report.据香港凤凰卫视(Phoenix TV)的视频资料和中文媒体澎湃(The Paper)报道,四名香港书商已承认向中国内地走私批判性政治图书。这四名书商于去年失踪,随后现身内地警方看守所。Gui Minhai, one of the owners of Causeway Bay Books, said in a broadcast by Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV on Sunday night that the sale of such books was “not legal” in China and that he and his colleagues had circumvented the rules.铜锣湾书店(Causeway Bay Books)店主之一桂敏海周日在凤凰卫视播出的一段视频中表示,在中国销售这些图书是“非法”的,他和他的同事避过了法规。“After several discussions, we considered ways to avoid Chinese official inspection,” he said in taped comments, the source of which was not revealed. “These included changing the book covers and putting the books into dark nylon bags to avoid X-ray inspection.”桂敏海在视频中说:“我们几次商量,研究规避中国官方检查的方式。其中包括更换书籍封面,用深色尼龙袋包装书籍,来逃避安检X光检测。”这段视频为提前录制,来源尚未被透露。Three of his colleagues also confessed in broadcast s to helping Mr Gui, a Swedish citizen, and claimed that they regretted their actions. It was not possible to reach them for comment.桂敏海的三位同事也在视频中供认协助他犯罪,并表示悔过。记者无法联系到他们请其置评。A separate story published by The Paper, a state-controlled Chinese media outlet, said they had smuggled 4,000 books into China, distributing them to 380 ers in 28 provinces.受官方控制的中国媒体机构澎湃也发表了一篇报道,称这四名书商向中国内地走私4000册图书,邮寄给了28个省份的380名读者。Televised confessions have become an increasingly common propaganda tool for Chinese police, as they expand an aly wide-ranging crackdown on dissent that has ensnared lawyers and labour activists as well as journalists, writers and publishers.电视认罪已成为中国警方越来越普遍的宣传工具,以此加强他们对异见分子业已全面的打击力度,律师、劳工维权人士、记者、作家和出版社,都已被这场打击裹挟进去。The confessions have painted Mr Gui, who disappeared from his home in Thailand last October, as the driving force behind Mighty Current. It is one of several publishing houses in Hong Kong producing books that would be banned in China because of their sensitive content, ranging from hefty historical tomes to lurid, apocryphal tales of top leaders’ personal lives.据这段电视认罪资料,去年10月从泰国家中失踪的桂敏海是巨流传媒有限公司(Mighty Current)的主要创始人。由于内容敏感,巨流以及香港其他几家出版社的图书在中国内地遭禁,其图书范围包括大量历史书籍,以及有关最高领导人个人生活的耸人听闻的杜撰故事。“[The books] have created a lot of rumours and bad influence on the society,” said Lam Wing Kee, who managed the bookstore, in his taped confession. “I have deeply acknowledged my fault. I am willing to be punished.”负责经营书店的林荣基在认罪录像中表示:“这些书对社会造成很多的谣言,对社会造成不良的影响。我已经深刻认识到自己的错误,愿意接受处罚。”The Paper cited Chinese police as saying that because Mr Lam and two other colleagues had been co-operative, they may be released on bail and allowed to return to Hong Kong soon. No information was provided on Mr Lee and Mr Gui’s likely fate.澎湃引用中国警方说法表示,由于林荣基、吕波、张志平认罪态度较好,有机会获取保候审,有望在近日返回香港。目前尚没有消息显示林荣基和桂敏海将接受何种处理。 /201603/429333

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